ECONOMICS AND MORE
HUMANISTIC DISCIPLINES:
WHAT ARE THE SOURCES
OF WISDOM FOR ANTITRUST?
LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVANt

The interaction between antitrust and economics is increasingly intimate. This fruitful interchange, carried on primarily in
the academy but in the court room as well, offers continuing
promise for antitrust. One purpose of this paper is to explore
some of the limits of what antitrust can fairly hope to gain from
economics. Another is to consider disciplines other than economics that antitrust scholars could pursue with profit. My thesis
is that antitrust scholarship could usefully explore the styles of
analysis and some of the material from the humanistic disciplines
of history and philosophy, and that it might be useful to draw
upon social sciences other than economics, particularly on
sociology and political science. Finally, I suggest that antitrust
would be well served by legal scholarship of a more conventional
kind than has been displayed in recent years.
My interest is not solely in the development of antitrust
rules or enforcement strategies. These activities are appropriate
tasks for legal scholarship. But I have another concern-quite
simply, to advance understanding of antitrust. In the university,
if not in the court room, the latter endeavor is as important as is
the former.
I.

THE USES OF ECONOMICS IN ANTITRUST

A seemingly rigorous way of thinking about antitrust derives
from a tradition of economic analysis that is associated primarily
with the University of Chicago and Yale. This approach, here
called the "Chicago school,"' uses two static, structural models,
t Professor of Law, University of California School of Law (Boalt Hall).
' The category is a loose one. I am referring to the work of scholars such as Posner,
Bork, Bowman, Brozen, Demsetz, and Stigler. Significant representative works include:
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS (1974); Bork,
Vertical Integrationand Competitive Processes, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS 139 (Wes-

ton & Peltzmann eds. 1969), Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
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the competitive market and the monopolized market. From the
assumptions of neoclassical economics it establishes theoretically
that when an industry is monopolized, there will be less investment, lower output and higher prices than if, other things being
equal, the industry were competitive. Chicago analysis asserts
that where monopoly exists resource allocations will be inefficient in the sense that total consumer satisfaction, as measured
by market prices, will be less than if the market were competitive.
Having only two structural models, this school relies on cartel theory as the only basis other than monopoly to explain the
occurrence of non-competitive performance. Moreover, many
analysts adhering to this tradition regard monopoly as rather
rare and cartels as subject to great instability. The constant
threat of entry and the constant discipline of inter-industry
competition reduce both the probability of monopoly 2 and the
longevity of cartelization.3 Chicago theory recognizes few barriers to entry other than scale efficiencies and governmental action, such as tariffs, patents and franchises. 4 It deals with vertical
restraint through monopoly and cartel theory. Restraints that
threaten foreclosure, such as tying, tend to be deemed expressions of the urge to discriminate and, though signifying some
degree of horizontal power, are viewed as having no greater
operational significance than other modes of discrimination. 5
Resale restraints are viewed as harmful only if imposed at the
instance of dealers utilizing the manufacturer to implement their
own cartel.6 If such restraints are imposed by the manufacturer
and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965) and 75 YALE L.J. 373, 375 (1966); Bowman,
The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 825 (1955);
Brozen, Significance of Profit Datafor Antitrust Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS
110 (Weston & Peltzmann, eds. 1969); Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief/About Monopoly in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164 (Goldschmid, Mann & Weston eds.

1974); Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
2 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY (Separate
Statement of Robert H. Bork) reprinted in 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 11, 53 (1968);
Demsetz, supra note 1.

'See, e.g., Hay & Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. L. &
ECON. 13 (1974); McGee, Cartels: Organization and Functions, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 191
(1960).
4 Bork, supra note 2; Demsetz, supra note 1.
' See, e.g., W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAv, 64-139 (1973); Bowman, Ting

Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Stigler, United States v.
Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block Booking, 1963 S. CT. REv. 152.
6 Bowman, supra note 1; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, 75 YALE I.J. 373, 405-10 (1966).
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they are regarded as incapable of raising prices above a competitive level because of competition from substitute products and
adjacent industries, and the threat of new entry.' Since the manufacturer is assumed, theoretically, to be acting in its own self
interest and subject to the discipline of the market, it is inferred
that these restraints are efficiency producing. A manufacturer's
minimum resale price, for example, may be aimed at achieving
the most efficient relationship between manufacturer and dealer
promotion. 8 So viewed, it is a contrivance intended to induce
dealers who, in their own competitive striving, will seek to expand sales so long as their costs are below the minimum price, to
keep spending more for promotion until their marginal costs
and marginal revenues intersect.
Chicago theory makes for an attractively tidy antitrust world.
Because private markets work surpassingly well so long as government does not interfere with them, and because most apparent aberrations turn out upon analysis to reflect efficiency producing decisions by traders operating under the constraints of
competitive pressure, the antitrust policemen need not be exceedingly busy. It is necessary to keep a sharp eye out for cartels,
of course, for, though cartels are always under pressure and
soon fall apart, they may do some harm before that inevitable
end.9 TJhus, there is some socially efficient level of inxestment in
antitrust enforcement. All that remains is for Congress to work
out an efficient matrix of deterrents, and for enforcement agencies to direct their activities solely toward those violations that
Chicago school theory identifies as socially harmful."'
An alternative way to draw upon neoclassical economics in
dealing with antitrust is exemplified by a style of inquiry proposing more complex and realistic models even at the cost of less
precise theoretical solutions. This tradition, 1 here called the
Bork, supra note 6, at 411-24.
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES,

ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 554-55
(1974).
'E.g., Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV.
1562 (1969).
'"See Posner, A Programfor the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 500 (1971).
" This category, although I call it a school, is even looser than the Chicago-Yale
school. I refer here to the work of a wider range of scholars, including Mason, Bain,
Scherer, Kaysen, Turner, Bok, Comanor and Williamson. Significant representative
works include: J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY (1959); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
8

PERFORMANCE (1970); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
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"Harvard school,"' 1 2 is less cohesive, more open, than the
Chicago school. Harvard analysis is less likely than is the Chicago
analysis to attribute oligopolistic industry structure to scale efficiencies. Harvard theorists recognize other barriers to entry,
such as control of scarce resources, high capital requirements,
and product differentiation.' 3 Harvard theorists follow the
Chicago school in adopting the monopoly and competition models, and likewise regard cartelization as being a greater risk in
markets of few sellers than in markets of many, but Harvard
theory envisages the additional possibility of non-collusive but
interdependent pricing in oligopolistic markets.' 4 Also, Harvard
theorists sometimes use dynamic models suggesting ways in
which foreclosing restraints like tying, requirements contracts, or
vertical mergers may injure competition. Thus they perceive the
possibility that vertical relationships may inhibit entry. They also
regard certain characteristic aspects of competitive style, such as
high advertising expenditures, as capable of dampening competition either by increasing capital requirements for entry, or by
increasing product differentiation and, thereby, tending to disaggregate markets. 16 The Harvard school is more likely than
Chicago to view resale restrictions as pernicious. 6 Harvard
theory, like Chicago theory, condemns resale restrictions implemented by dealer cartels,' 7 but even when the impetus for
74 HARV. L. REv. 226 (1960); Comanor, Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions: White
Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1968); Mason, Monopoly in Law and
Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34 (1937); Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70
HARV. L. REv. 281 (1956); Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost
Considerations, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1439 (1974).
12 It is much harder to defend this label than it is the Chicago school label since I
include within the Harvard school a diffuse group of scholars from various institutions.
The label is, however, a convenient one and I use it because Mason, who is in some sense
the intellectual progenitor of the kind of industrial organization economics to which I
refer, did his work at Harvard, and because he, Bain, Kaysen, Turner, Bok and others
worked as a group at Harvard in the mid to late 1950's. See Mason, Introduction to C.
KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959).
13See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956).
14 See F.

13 1-57
(1970).
15

SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND

E.g., P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS,

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES 18-19 (2d ed.

1974).
16E.g., Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and its
Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1968); see generally Schildkraudt, Areas of Primary
Responsibility and Other Territorial Restraints in Channels of Distribution Under the Antitrust
Laws: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 11 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROB. 509 (1975).
17Compare authorities cited supra note 6 and accompanying text with, e.g., Comanor,
supra note 16.
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Harvard analysts
such restraints comes from the manufacturer,
8
harmful.'
potentially
as
see them
Neoclassical economics is, perhaps, the most rigorous and
narrowly focused of the social sciences. Regardless of how complex its models may become, they are mechanical models drawn
by analogy from a Newtonian view of the physical universe. Its
categories are precisely defined and discrete. Reliance upon such
a mode of analysis in antitrust may lead to an unduly limited
conception of statutory purpose. This risk is particularly acute
with Chicago theory. Indeed Chicago analysts tend to identify
the efficient allocation of resources, a value derived from neoclassical economics, as the sole goal of antitrust. 19 Professor
Bork, who is associated with this school, has argued that the
legislative history of the Sherman Act warrants the conclusion
that allocative efficiency was the sole concern of Congress. 2°1 Despite the brilliance of Bork's argument, it is not likely to convince
one who does not start with the view that allocative efficiency is
the only concern with which the Act ought to deal. Both
Thorelli's far richer study of the Act and its antecedents 2 ' and
Letwin's historical excursion 22 carry conviction that congressional purpose was both vaguer and broader than Chicago
analysts will allow.2 3 Moreover, the vagueness and generality of
the Sherman Act suggest the legitimacy and normative force of
the interpretation of the Act that has found expression in its
judicial development. If there is anything that was settled by the
debate about statutory purpose between Professors Bork and
Bowman, on the one side, and Professors Blake and Jones, on
the other, it is that for nearly a century the courts have taken a
objectives of antitrust than those sugvastly wider view of the
2 4
gested by economics.
When one sets antitrust in a broader historical context, and
Comanor, supra note 16.
"See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 5-14 (1974).
20 Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
21 H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955). See Blake & Jones, Toward
A Three-DimensionalAntitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422, 422-23 (1965).
22 W. LETWiN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA (1965).
23 The legislative history of subsidiary antitrust statutes is even more convincing
that the concern of Congress embraced goals such as individual freedom, entrepreneurial opportunity, independence, local control of industry, and the political objective of
self policing markets. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23
(1962) (discussing legislative history of § 7 of Clayton Act as amended).
24 Compare Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363 (1965)
with Blake & Jones, supra note 21.
18
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tries to assign it its proper place in the evolution of social ideas in
America, the conclusion that antitrust has a wider office than
Bork suggests becomes well nigh irresistible. The technological
and economic changes occurring after the Civil War transformed American industry in ways that affected virtually every
aspect of American life. The nation was integrated with a system
of railroads and a telephone and telegraph network. New
methods of mineral extraction, new sources of energy, new
methods of steel production, and new techniques for preserving
and shipping food all had their impacts. The scale of industrial
activity expanded rapidly and dramatically and as it did so, the
scale and scope of political and community life expanded in
reaction. All of this yielded the tensions and ambivalences that
are inevitably associated with profound changes in the conditions
of life. The Sherman Act took form in that atmosphere. It was,
indeed, one of the few significant American governmental responses to the transformation of American life resulting from
economic development during the last decades of the nineteenth
century. No one who knows anything about life or politics could
expect to find theoretical rigor or doctrinal purity in such a
statutory instrument.
Hofstadter is persuasive that antitrust expresses an abiding
American conservatism, a perennial American impulse to find
ways to divide, limit and diffuse both governmental and nongovernmental power.2 5 It is not that this impulse has ever stood
unchallenged on the scene. It has not. There has been an ongoing dialectic between those who would contain great power and
those who would invite its use, either by the private sector or by
government. The Sherman Act is seen most fully as one product
of that dialectic. The Act was invoked by the same kinds of social
and political pressures as those to which Populism and the Progressive Movement responded, each in its unique way.26 In the
history of American political and social ideas, the Sherman Act
was in an important sense more clearly prefigured by Jacksonian
attacks on the "monopolistic" Bank of the United States,27 than it
25

R.

HOFSTADTER,

What Happened to the Antritrust Movement? in

THE PARANOID

STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 233 (1965).

2' See R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955).
2

7 See, e.g., M.

MEYERS,

THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF (1960),

which stresses the role of ideology in the attacks on the bank and exemplifies a way of
approaching problems of relative values and policy that may have uses for the law. For
an earlier exploration of relationships between concepts of public interest and regula-
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was by anything early economists had to say about efficiency.2 8
The static models of economics fail to illuminate antitrust's
role as a response to, and later as a mediator of the profound
changes in technology and industrial structure that have occurred in America over the course of the present century. If the
currently conventional techniques of neoclassical economics had
been brought to bear each year to prepare a national report on
these changes, what would these reports have said? Most would
have taken note of increases in efficiency in producing and distributing goods. Many would have questioned whether large
firms, or groups of firms, were gaining market power that might
increase consumer prices. Several might have attempted to compare consumer losses due to market power with efficiency gains.
Several might have had something to say about increases in the
variety of goods and in consumer conveniences. Some might
have noted salient distributional effects of some of the technological changes that were occurring. In short, they would
have focused on the phenomena of market structure to which
economic analysis is attuned. Yet one suspects that no such study
based on conventional modes of economic analysis would take
account of the non-material and less readily quantifiable welfare
consequences of change in technology and industrial structure.
Americans today live out their lives in a vastly different world
than that of their fathers and grandfathers. The social, political
and economic institutions through which they express themselves are almost all on a larger scale now than they were at the
end of the last century. Many of the forces that now affect them
are less personal, more remote, than they used to be. A people
may care about these changes as well as about changes in efficiency and market power. They may expect policy about industrial structure to deal with their concerns, and it would be incongruous to suppose that antitrust would not reflect such solicitude.
Fortunately, antitrust courts have not limited their inquiries
to the categories identified by economists. Theoretical economics
tion of economic activity, see 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY
OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1744-1861
(rev. ed. 1969).
28 Even as late as the turn of the century leading economists found little reason for
concern in increasing industrial concentration. See, e.g., Clark, The Society of the Future,
53 THE INDEPENDENT 1649 (1901) reprinted in DEMOCRACY AND THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH
77 (G. Kennedy, ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as GOSPEL OF WEALTH].
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has informed and at times infused the development of antitrust
in the years since 1890.29 But a comprehensive search for the
meaning and significance of antitrust, as it has changed over the
years, must supplement the study of case law with something
more than economics. The changing perceptions of and attitudes about antitrust that ultimately affect its content-and I
am speaking very broadly here of the views and attitudes of the
bench, the bar, the legislative and executive branches, and the
constituencies of business, labor, and consumers affected by the
law-are interrelated with changes in social and political attitudes that have affected other American institutions as well.311

One seeking to identify the social forces mediated and the values
expressed through antitrust during the early years of this century will learn more from the "gospel of wealth" literature and
31
its contemporary critics, than from economists of the period.
One seeking to learn what antitrust was concerned with in the
1930's can learn more from the "business commonwealth" exponents, and their contemporary critics, than from what economists had to say during that decade. 32 Here, again, the unify-9See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
31 Once again, one may turn with profit to the historical literature. See, e.g., E.
HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC

AMBIVALENCE (1966) (examining the vagueness and ambivalence of New Deal policy as
national economics planners, competitive marketeers, and proponents of cartelization
vied with each other in an effort to reconcile 19th century ideals with 20th century
industrial structure); M. KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910: A STUDY

OF THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER (1963) (sketching an interesting picture of socially
dominant attitudes toward laissez-faire during the late 19th century); A. PAUL,
CONSERVATIVE

CRISIS

AND

THE

RULE OF LAW:

ATTITUDES

OF BAR AND

BENCH,

1887-1895 (1960) (analyzing attitudes affecting late 19th century shifts in judicial policy
affecting conomic matters);

R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967)

(analyzing shifts in values associated with the emergence of a mass society).
31 The extensive literature that associated material progress with moral worth and
the literature of a social Darwinism that saw achievement as an inexorable expression of
some grand and universal design were expressive of widely held ideologies affecting
social policy. See, e.g., R. CONWELL, ACRES OF DIAMONDS (1890); M. HOPKINS, THE LAW
OF LOVE AND LOVE AS LAW (1868); A. Carnegie, Wealth, 148 NORTH AM. REV. 653
(1889); GOSPEL OF WEALTH, supra note 25. But there was also current a liberal,
rationalistic and pragmatic view of the effects of changes in the scale of industrial and
related institutions. E.g., W. Ghent, The Next Step: A Benevolent Feudalism, 54 THE
INDEPENDENT 781 (1902), reprinted in GOSPEL OF WEALTH, Supra note 25, at 92.
32 There was during the thirties an enormous and politically effective literature that
extolled cooperation among business firms and rational economic planning by assemblies of business managements, and condemned price cutting and other such competitive tactics as unethical chisling. See, e.g., W. L. CHURCHILL, PRICING FOR PROFIT (1932);
B. JAVITS, BUSINESS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1932); C. STEVENSON, THE WAY OUT
(1932). Criticism came from two directions: from exponents of collectivist, democratic,
national industrial planning, which focused on social problems like poverty and power-
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ing concept is the American concern with power, a concern having political and social wellsprings, and transcending in scope the
technical concept of market power articulated by economists.
Judicial decisions 33 and legislative developments 34 have consistently reflected that concern.
It may be much the same today. One can no longer assert
that antitrust is the major governmental intervention aimed at
dealing with industrial transformation and its social effects. For
the last fifty years or so the nation has implemented various
regulatory programs, has socialized many activities and has used
the taxing and spending power to affect economic conduct and
performance. Nevertheless, there has never been a consensus
about how much or what kinds of power can be left in private
hands, or whether government is a safe or wholesome counterforce. Those issues rage as heatedly today as ever. 3 5 Perhaps the
contemporary significance of antitrust, .like its past significance,
lies primarily in the role it continues to play in the working out of
those political and social issues. To argue, as do the Chicago
economists, that antitrust ought to be used solely to inhibit expressions of market power in a technical economic sense, is not
only to miss much in the history and development of the law, but
lessness of workers, e.g., G. SOULE, A PLANNED SOCIETY (1932); R. TUGWELL & H. HILL,
OUR ECONOMIC SOCIETY AND ITS PROBLEMS (1934); and from those who wanted to reduce
or limit the scale of industrial organization. See, e.g., L. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS
(1934); F. FRETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (193 1). Hawley describes the struggle
among adherents of these competing views to shape New Deal policy. E. HAWLEY, THE
NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966).

33 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 19 (1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("It is competition, not competitors, which [the
Clayton] Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance
of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in
favor of decentralization."); Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 4-5 (1958); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 100 (1920).
31 See note 23 supra. For recent indications of the scope of congressional attitudes
reflected in antitrust legislation, see the legislative history of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, reported in, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4054, 4054; H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4054, 4078; H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4054, 4119; S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1.

35 There is an immense literature on bureaucratic excesses and deficiencies, corporate and public. See, e.g., J. DEUTSCH, SELLING THE PEOPLE'S CADILLAC: THE EDSEL AND
CORPORATE

RESPONSIBILITY

(1976);

W.

GELLHORN,

GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS (1956); F. HAYEK,
LILIENTHAL, BIG BUSINESS: A NEW ERA (1952).

INDIVIDUAL

THE ROAD

TO

FREEDOM

SERFDOM
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(1944); E.
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to ignore much of its potential. Champions of governmental
planning to manage the industrial sector, 36 as well as exponents
of cartelization 3 7 are still to be found. But today, as in the past,
the other side of the field is not peopled solely by those who
value efficiency and are committed to neoclassical concepts about
how to achieve it. The political consensus that supports antitrust
comes from other sources. Americans continue to value institutions the scale and the workings of which they can comprehend.
Many continue to value the decentralization of decisionmaking
power and responsibility. Many favor structures in which power
in one locus may be checked by power in another. Antitrust, broadly perceived and sensitively administered, may contribute to the realization of these values. So doing, it may reduce
various of the pressures for fuller governmental regulation of
38
commercial and industrial activity.
Issues like these are difficult ones for scholarship to deal
with. They are intrinsically vague. There is no cohesive body of
theory, like neoclassical micro-economics, that can be invoked
surehandedly. But the difficulty does not absolve the academy if
it persists in ignoring such matters. Moreover, as suggested in
part II of this paper, there are traditions of inquiry and modes
of analysis that might usefully be brought to bear.
Let me now turn to a very different concern about the use
of economics in antitrust: the theory used may be wrong. Differ3 9
ences between Harvard and Chicago analysis are suggestive.
There are points on which both cannot be right. But there are
more general problems. Some have to do with the cultural validity of basic presuppositions, such as that firms are profit maximizers and individuals maximizers of utility. Firms are groups
of people and people in groups are complex. 411 Other problems
have to do with the transposition of theory into empirical contexts. Even when a theory accurately describes how firms would
act in a market meeting all of the factual assumptions of the
theory, it may mislead one who reasons from the theory what
J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
See Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion, 50 U. VA. L. REV.
413, 428-31 (1964); Wilson, Restrictive Practices, in COMPETITION, CARTELS AND THEIR
REGULATION 114 (J. P. Miller, ed. 1962).
31 See Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 377 (1965).
39 See text accompanying notes 41-52 infra.
36 See
37

4" A growing literature raises questions about the reliability of neoclassical assumpBANMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND

tions about firm conduct. See, e.g., W.
GROWTH (rev. ed. 1967).
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will happen in a real market if, in ways unperceived, the real
does not sufficiently match the theoretical market.
Industrial organization theorists, who insist upon the existence of a functional relationship between market structure and
market conduct, have tended to regard the structure of the industry rather than the conduct of the firm as the variable that
antitrust policy should be used to influence. It may well be that
this emphasis should be reversed. Political and practical constraints make it enormously difficult for a court or an administrative agency to alter the structure of an industry in ways that
promise better industrial performance. By contrast, these institutions are well suited to the task of holding individual firms
accountable for their conduct. Moreover, when industrial organization economists do examine conduct, they tend to make
judgments about conduct by looking only at structure or only at
structure and certain objective indicia of conduct, such as pricecost relationships. There are, however, many questions about
firm conduct that might be investigated directly by examining
internal correspondence, memoranda of intracorporate meetings and by interrogating corporate officers about the purposes
of particular courses of conduct engaged in by the firm.
The treatment of vertical issues illustrates some of.the problems mentioned above. Chicago analysts regard it as a waste of
resources to attack resale restrictions imposed by manufacturers.4 1 Only those vertical restraints imposed at the instance
of a dealers' cartel are harmful. Territorial restrictions, for
example, are not seen as likely to arise from dealer cartelization.
Thus a specific explanation why these arrangements are
efficiency-producing becomes necessary to save theoretical presuppositions to which the analysis is anchored. Explanations
sometimes used for vertical territorial restrictions are that the
manufacturer imposed the restraints in order to force recalcitrant dealers to operate at efficient scale,4 2 or to prevent dealers
from "free riding" on the services and promotions offered by
others in the nonexclusive territory.4 3 Efficiency through scale
economies is altogether a worthy goal. But any claim by a manufacturer that its program of territorial assignments is connected
41E.g., Bork, supra note 6; Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis
of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. R~v. 282 (1975).
2
See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 160-61 (1976).
4 Bork, supra note 6, at 435.
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to the achievement of scale efficiencies is likely to be specious.4 4
This is comprehended by the Harvard school. One spokesman
applauds the trend to per se condemnation of vertical restraints,
even at the instance of the manufacturer.4 5 Another, discussing
the related question of the possible effects of vertical integration on efficiency, avoids the traditional argument that functional interdependence dictates common ownership. 4 6 Instead,
a "transactional approach" is adopted that recognizes "contractual contingencies [that may] overwhelm the limited planning capacities of parties subject to bounded rationality. ...
Treatment of monopoly pricing similarly reveals the faults
of a rigorous economic approach that values generalized analysis
of structure above inquiry into human conduct and the disorder
of the market. Harvard school analysts are more likely to utilize
longer run or dynamic models, and thus to increase the realism,
if also the complexity, of the analysis. Chicago analysts are likely
to assume a monopolist will produce to the point where marginal
cost and marginal revenue intersect and will price to clear the
market. 48 This yields -the highest short run monopoly profit, but
also does the most to attract entry. Harvard theorists are more
likely to assume a limit pricing strategy, which will be calculated
to yield a supra-competitive, though lower, return over a longer
period. 49 If one of the by-products of the Harvard penchant
for complexity is fewer determinate solutions, I count that an
44"Try to picture the director of a state owned enterprise deploying distribution
facilities in an effort to attain maximum efficiency. The image is so fanciful that it
could be adhered to only by ignoring both the limits of practical knowledge about
scale efficiency and the vitality and disorder displayed by the industrial establishment
existing in reality at any given time, a disorder and disarray in the very bricks and
mortar of monuments to a sequence of earlier judgments and decisions about facility
size. The hypothetical director would know that he knew too little, and would be too
thoroughly constricted by the status quo to permit himself to indulge in the kind of
dream we have made for him. He would count himself lucky if he had the opportunity
to design a single outlet in a single region approaching his best, informed judgment
about appropriate plant size and service territory. How much more preposterous, then,
is the picture of a manufacturer negotiating with a group of dealers, each possessed of
its own real plant built to the scale that seemed appropriate to a single profit-oriented
management at some earlier date, dividing markets in ways that will maximize scale
efficiencies. See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 82 (1977).
45 Comanor, supra note 11.
46 Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 122 U. PA.
L. REv.
1439, 1454-56 (1974).
47
Id. 1450.
41R. POSNER, Supra note 1, at 5-14.
49See J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 269-76 (2d ed. 1976); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

219-31 (1970).
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advantage. It is not well to suppose that we have theoretical
validation for things that are not theoretically knowable.
Wisdom is also shown by Harvard school analysts who recognize that it may be essential to move away from general
theoretical models, even dynamic ones, in an effort to understand the particulars of a specific market situation. Oliver Williamson exemplifies this in a recent paper on franchise bidding.
The paper criticized the contention of some Chicago theorists
that franchise bidding schemes in natural monopoly industries
would provide more of the benefits of free markets than is now
achieved by public regulation of utilities. At the outset Williamson says:
Merely to show that regulation is flawed . . . does not
establish that regulation is an inferior mode of organizing economic activity. For one thing, the disabilities of
regulation are apt to vary with both the type of activity
regulated and the form of regulation attempted. Secondly, before regulation is supplanted, there is an obligation to assess the properties of the proposed
alternative-not only in general, but also specifically
with respect to the activity in question. If the proposed
mode is flawed in similar or different respects, the purported advantages of shifting out of regulation may be
5
illusory. 11
This dictum may also be a useful guide to analysis of possible
antitrust interventions in markets not subject to regulation. Assume that a particular market does not perform well. Ideally,
one ought to understand the dynamics of that particular market,
and the purposes and effects in that particular market of discernible structural elements and conduct patterns. 5 ' Indeed, it
may be necessary to take account of motivations, and customary
patterns, which are not explicable in terms of profit maximizing
or anything else within the ken of conventional economic
theory. 52 Next one ought to consider possible ways in which the
51 Williamson, FranchiseBiddingfor Natural Monopolies-In General and With Respect to
CATV, 7 BELLJ. ECON. 73 (1976).
" See generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUSr § 119 (1977).
52 As one possible example, there is some empirical support for the insight of
Judge Wyzanski, United States v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947,
961-62 (D. Mass. 1950), that firms cooperating with each other in one context will be
less likely to compete with each other in other contexts. See Mead, The Competitive Significance of Joint Ventures, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 819 (1967). Whether or not a general
case can be made about the matter, it may well be that in some particular instances joint
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observed structure or conduct might be altered by a court decree. Only then is one in a position to evaluate whether the
structure or conduct that a decree might mandate is likely to
yield performance socially preferable to that which the market
currently displays. Only if an affirmative answer is warranted
does the potential intervention promise social advantage.
The Harvard approach differs from the Chicago approach
in another important respect. At least the lawyers among the
Harvard analysts struggle to deal in reasoned ways with constraints on the range of responses that are feasible, given that
antitrust is not a program of economic planning but a system of
rights and remedies enforced primarily through litigation in the
courts.13 This effort to modify economic insights to facilitate

their use by the courts is commendable. But it entails grave difficulties, as the recent debate concerning predatory pricing between Areeda and Turner, on the one hand, and Scherer, on the
54
other, serves to reveal.
The goal of the Areeda-Turner study was to develop
economically sophisticated, yet judicially administrable legal
rules for determining when price cutting by a firm with market
power should be characterized as predatory. The authors take as
the goal of competition an allocation of resources that is efficient
in the short run and seek to specify simple objective functions to
identify pricing strategies that distort efficiency. Suppose that a
firm with market power charges a price below its short run profit maximizing price in order to discourage entry. At what point
is the reduction to be characterized as predatory? Areeda and
Turner conclude that a price reduction by the firm with market
power ought to be characterized as predatory only if the challenged price falls below the firm's marginal cost or its average
total cost, whichever is lower. 55 The authors theorize that any
relations in one area may lead to dampened competitive striving in others. See Pfeffer
and Nowark, Patterns of Joint Activity: Implications for Antitrust Policy, 21 ANTITRUST BULL.
315 (1976).
53 See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
"See Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV.
869, (1976); Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L. REV.
891 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REV. 901 (1976),
in which F.M. Scherer debates with Areeda and Turner the soundness of the thesis
Areeda and Turner put forward in Areeda & Turner, supra note 53.
" They also propose variable cost as a surrogate for marginal costs, because of the
difficulty of determining marginal cost empirically. Areeda & Turner, supra note 53, at
897.
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entry-deterring price reduction that did not fall below this
baseline would not have any adverse resource allocation consequences.

56

In rebuttal, Scherer first asserts that, in the output range
where marginal cost exceeds average cost, short term anticompetitive consequences can occur if a firm with market power is
allowed to price below marginal cost, but above average cost. 57
Such a price would survive the Areeda-Turner test of predation,
but Scherer reasons that if a new entrant could produce at
minimum cost only by entry at significant scale, an actual or
threatened preemptive expansion into the output range reducing price to a level between marginal and average cost would be
an effective deterrent to entry.
Scherer's second criticism directly addresses the AreedaTurner goals of administrability and sophistication. He establishes theoretically that a price-equals-marginal-cost rule might
maximize social welfare in the short run, but could have adverse
long run effects on resource allocation. 58 Scherer's theoretical
dictum is that if as a result of a price reduction today future
prices will be a higher percentage of costs than they would have
been but for today's price reduction, then any judgment whether
the price reduction is helpful or harmful to resource allocation
must take into account the future efficiency losses as well as the
current gains or losses. -Scherer then hypothesizes circumstances
in which price reductions not violating the Areeda-Turner rule
would, by discouraging entry and facilitating higher prices in the
future, adversely affect long run resource allocations. He proposes, in lieu of the Areeda-Turner test, a rule that characterizes
as predatory only price reductions that, after analysis, can be
shown to threaten resource allocation in the long run. This test
would require consideration of a number of complex variables
including the relative cost positions of the firm with market
56 Given the pervasive "second best" problem, there is serious question whether an
optimum allocation of resources, in the welfare economics sense, is a plausible goal for
economic policy. See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST, § l(b) (1977). It is, however, a reasonable
policy goal that prices in any industry be closely related to cost. While both Areeda and
Turner and Scherer seem to have optimum allocation in the first sense in mind, it
appears that their analyses neither gain nor lose force if one treats their concept of
optimum resource allocation as though they had in view the more limited and seemingly more attainable goal of a close relation in any given industry between prices and
costs.
57 Scherer, supra note 54, at 869-75, 882-83.
58
1d. 883-90.

1977]

SOURCES OF WISDOM FOR ANTITRUST

1229

power and the potential entrants, scale economy relationships,
whether the firm with power expands output as price is reduced,
and, if so, whether the new output is maintained or withdrawn
when the entry threat is overcome, and the like. The Scherer test
would also require that a socially valid discount rate be adopted
and used when summing future welfare losses with present gains
or losses.
The Scherer analysis is theoretically convincing. Yet its
economic sophistication betrays its lack of judicial administrability. As Areeda and Turner rejoin, the long run possibilities that
Scherer urges the court to analyze are intrinsically speculative
and indeterminate. Courts would have difficulty in dealing with
them.
How is antitrust to respond when proponents of the two
most comprehensive economic analyses available offer solutions
at once so thoughtful and so unsatisfying? It may be that courts
can avoid the dilemma only by looking beyond economic theory
for ways of dealing with predatory conduct. If we are going to
rely on judges and jurors to discover predatory practices
perhaps their inquiry cannot be limited to price-cost relationships or focused exclusively on efficiency as a value. The traditional legal rule focuses on human animus. It speaks in terms of
intent and identifies the predatory firm as one trying to inhibit
others in ways independent of the predator's own ability to perform effectively in the market. Predation as conventionally
viewed may involve grossly tortious conduct, like warehouse
burning. A price reduction or expenditure is predatory where it
has analogous qualities, when it is designed to impose losses on
other firms in order to exclude them.5 9 The traditional rule, like
the theoretical analyses here reviewed, takes competition as the
central value. But instead of seeking objective indicia of competitive injury solely in the price-cost relationship it gives credit to
the common insight that a purpose to avoid competition by disposing of competitors is likely to lead to competitive injury. The
'9 Factors said to be indicative of "predatory intent" are analyzed in Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348
U.S. 115 (1955); Balian's Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956); National.Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d
605 (7th Cir. 1969); F.&A. Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 98 F. Supp. 180, 189-90
(S.D. Cal. 1951). Cases are collected in Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly
Expansionaz, Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REv. 373 (1974)
and in VAN KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE

REGULATION, §§ 29.02, 37.04 (1976).
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traditional rule thus draws upon tort concepts and methodologies. It presupposes that there are norms of acceptable conduct in a competitive market as elsewhere, and that purpose is
a useful guide in measuring conduct against those norms.
If this traditional rule governing predation is accepted,
there are obvious factors to be examined in addition to price-cost
relationships. A firm seeking to expel or exclude rivals by selling
at unremunerative prices will leave traces; it will have gathered
market information, considered it, and decided upon a course of
conduct to attain its socially disapproved end.611 Pretrial discovery procedures are quite efficient in uncovering such traces and
they are more easily proven than the pricing strategies condemned by either Scherer or Areeda-Turner. To contend that
the conventional formulation of predatory conduct, which looks,
in a sense, for evil, ought to be amended to one that looks solely
to an effect validated by economic studies is to assume too much
about the precision of applied economics and to assume too
little-not just about the constraints on a trier of fact-but about
the value of more humanistic modes of inquiry.
Rigorous analysis, like the Areeda-Turner and Scherer
studies, obviously should be encouraged, and no doubt both will
have practical use as well as theoretical interest. But the time has
not yet come to abandon the conventional approach; Scherer
seems right about the limitations of the Areeda-Turner rule and
Areeda and Turner seem right about the complexities of the
Scherer approach. Moreover, the conventional rule may successfully ferret out instances where harm is done to resource allocation in the short run that would escape detection under the
Areeda-Turner rule. Areeda and Turner envisage two basic
situations. 61 In the first, the plant of the firm with market power
is well adapted to producing at the output that maximizes its
return. Where there were significant scale efficiencies, new entry
would be warranted only if the entrant were able to obtain a
substantial portion of the presently unmet "residual demand"that is, demand from buyers who will not pay as much as the
profit-maximizing price now charged by the firm with power but
who would pay more than cost plus a fair return to a firm producing at efficient scale. In the second situation, the firm with
power is operating with substantial excess capacity. Scherer in6,,

L.

SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST

§ 43 (1977).

61 Areeda & Turner, supra note 53.
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fers, for cogent reasons, that preemptive expansion by the firm
with power is more likely to occur in the first situation than the
second. 62 If it does occur in the first situation, the firm with
power may be able to deter entry by reducing price to a level
below marginal but not below average cost, a cut which, as
Scherer shows, threatens short run resource allocations without
violating the Areeda-Turner price-cost rule.
By contrast, a judge or jury operating under the conventional rule, with its focus upon intent, might well characterize
such a price reduction as predatory. Such a trier of fact might
have before it data similar to that on which the Areeda-Turner
analysis is based; it might also have before it an analysis of that
data showing the likely adverse long run effects of the firm's
policy, an analysis comparable to the one done by Scherer in his
criticism of the Areeda-Turner rule. Unconstrained by the
Areeda-Turner rule it might infer from the data and the analysis
that the price reduction was predatory. But even if such sophisticated material were not available, the trier of fact might well be
provided with evidence of the perceptions held by the management of the price-making firm about its market situation, and
evidence about the objectives management was trying to achieve
by its pricing policy. These data, too, might lead to a conclusion
of predatory intent. Thus, the conventional approach is likely to
invalidate many of the price reductions which would escape the
Areeda-Turner rule, even though, as Scherer shows, they are
harmful to short run resource allocation.6 3
62 Scherer, supra note 54, at 883.

Two subsidiary points should be made. First, the conventional approach, being
capable of finding predation where the Areeda-Turner test does not, is capable not
only of characterizing as unlawful conduct that the Areeda-Turner test would treat as
lawful, and which, if it were understood fully, would be seen to threaten long run
injury to resource allocations, but is also capable of characterizing as unlawful conduct
13

that the Areeda-Turner test would treat as lawful, and which, if it were understood
fully, would be seen not to threaten long run injury to resource allocations. I see no
theoretical or empirical basis for concluding that it will do the first more often than the
second, or the second more often than the first. I do suggest that one ought not to
screen out intuition and judgment in circumstances in which available instruments for
measurement are demonstrably too blunt to be definitive.
Second, I do not argue that the conventional rule is as acute as is the Scherer
approach in identifying price reductions that threaten long run resource misallocations.
The Scherer approach is rejected as a comprehensive norm not because it is insensitive,
but because it is unadministrable. In any event, the conventional rule would not foreclose an evidentiary presentation predicated on one of the Scherer models in any case
in which credible evidence respecting the nature of relevant functions and of firm perceptions about them was available. Moreover, the conventional formulation seems less
likely to yield results that may distort long run allocations than does the Areeda-Turner
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The best course, then, is to leave the avenues of inquiry as
open as may be. Objective data, such as that stressed by Areeda
and Turner, and even data responsive to the more complex
analysis of Scherer, could then be used either to attack or defend, but so also could any other evidence indicative of predatory intent. A major focus would remain on intrafirm perceptions about the firm's competitive situation and the objectives of
64
its pricing policy.
In sum, economic theory is most useful to antitrust when
those who are using it come most fully to terms with the richness
and variety of the antitrust enterprise as a system of law. One
must first allow that antitrust aims at values other than economic
efficiency, that antitrust has other value sources. One must also
allow that courtrooms are not laboratories for empirical investigation of issues framed by economists, but institutions for dispute
resolution that have strengths and weaknesses explicable only in
terms of the legal tradition. Once these concessions are made, it
becomes possible to draw powerful analytical material from
economics into the service of antitrust. But these materials must
be transformed in the process, and seldom will they serve alone.
II.

THE USES OF

MORE

HUMANISTIC DISCIPLINES IN ANTITRUST

If economics does not fully illuminate antitrust issues where
else can one turn? In this section I attempt merely to suggest
probable sources of insight and to share my thoughts about some
of them.
If, as suggested above, the contemporary importance of antitrust lies primarily in its relation to the social and political
dynamic through which power is allocated, sociology may contribute to an understanding of relevant relationships. The antinomies of conflict and consensus, stability and change,
bureaucracy and democracy have been among the classic conrule. Lacking usable measures that are demonstrably more sensitive, it is plausible to
conclude that we are more likely to protect against long run injury to competition by
identifying those who are trying to injure competition than by relying on objective functions that are not attuned to long run effects at all.
61 This course may also enable courts to avoid another problem associated with the
Areeda-Turner test: difficulty in determining when profits exceed normal returns, a
problem much stressed by some of the Chicago theorists. E.g., Brozen, Significance of
Profit Datafor Antitrust, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS 110 (1968); Peltzman, Profit
Data and Public Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS 128 (1968). In short, the
conventional rule, which focuses on motive, may be more easily and sure handedly
administered than the seemingly more objective price-cost rule.
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cerns of sociology. 65 Contemporary sociological research deals
66
with many issues relevant to antitrust. Organization theory,
the social aspects of economic development, 67 social differentiation within business organizations, and the ways in which differentiation relates to organization size and related variables ,68
the politics of bureaucracy,6 9 and theory about the way norms
and values are legitimized and transformed 71 all have potential
significance.
A limited sociological literature addresses questions relating
to corporate structure in ways that suggest the possibility that
sociology may, in time, be able to make direct contributions to
antitrust, much as does economics today. This literature focuses
upon relationships between organizations and their environments and seeks to analyze the ways in which organizations modify and are modified by their environments.7 1 One branch of

" The value questions with which antitrust must deal have had the attention of
sociologists for as long or longer than they have had the attention of economists. Alexis
de Tocqueville addressed questions about the forces causing a centralization of power.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 9-11 (Paris 1835) (Vintage Books ed. 1954).

Max Weber's more theoretical treatment of bureaucracy has continued to influence
modern sociological

thought. See T.

PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION

503-13 (1937).
66E.g., C. ARGRIS, ORGANIZATION OF A BANK (1954); P. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF

(1955); A. ETZIONI, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX ORGANIZA(1961).
67 Sociological literature dealing with economic development abandons the hedonistic assumption of many economists that "utility" is necessarily maximized by increases in
consumption of economic goods, and seeks to identify with greater precision the way
values and institutions are modified conjunctively with economic developmental processes. Most of the literature deals with underdeveloped societies, but the
methodologies and theoretical concepts no doubt have wider application. For an excellent survey, see Moore, Social Aspects of Economic Development, in HANDBOOK OF
BUREAUCRACY

TIONS

SOCIOLOGY 882 (R. Faris, ed. 1964). N. SMELSER, SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE INDUSTRIAL

REVOLUTION (1959) is a brilliant study of effects of industrial change that utilizes both
the methods of sociology and those of history. See also N. SMELSER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
EcONOMIC LIFE (1963).

68 Here, again, there is a considerable literature, but most of it does not address
issues of direct concern to antitrust. Yet, one comes away from the sociological material
with the recognition that the quality of life varies in significant ways with significant
differences in the scale, structure and characteristics of important institutions, like the
economic ones, within which people function. S. LIPsET & R. BENDIX, SOCIAL MOBILITY

IN INDUSTRIAL SoCIErY (1959) is a basic contribution to the literature.
69 Bureaucracy theory begins with M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (1947). The literature is vast and uneven. See Greer & Orleans,
PoliticalSociology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY 808 (R. Faris, ed. 1964) for a survey.
7

See,

e.g.,

P.

NONET,

ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE:

ADVOCACY

AND

CHANGE

IN

A

GOVERNMENT AGENCY (1969). See also Nonet, For JurisprudentialSociology, 10 L. & Soc.

REv. 525 (1976) (surveying the research tasks for sociology in dealing with law).
71 For a survey of the recent literature see Aldrich & Pfeffer, Environments of
Organization, 2 AM. REV. Soc. 79 (1976).
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theory develops its models not by analogy to mechanics, as do
economists, but by analogy to the biological sciences. Its basic
theoretical concept is that in the long run organizations are differentially selected for survival in accordance with the fit between organizational structure and environmental characteristics. 72 Another branch of theory develops what are called
"resource dependent" models. 7 3 These theories, while owing
something to the evolutionary analogy, insist that the need to
survive need not constrain organizations severely because organizations can alter both themselves and their environments.
Resource dependent theorists assert that the crucial questions
that need to be illuminated concern the way organizations make
choices about internal structure and conduct from among the
array of all environmentally possible choices. 74 As the phrase
"resource dependent" implies, theorists in this group insist that
organizations cannot generate internally all the resources needed
to survive and that the ultimate goal that explains both changes
in organizational structure and changes in the environment
initiated by the organization is the need to attract resources
from the external environment.
None of this theory is as advanced or as precise or supported by so wide an academic consensus as is much of microeconomic theory. Very little of it is ready to be drawn directly to
bear on antitrust.7 5 However, the movement from the mechanical models of the economists to the more complex biological
models of the sociologists is not lacking in appeal. It comprehends both intrafirm and interfirm phenomena; sociologists see a vital business organization capable within limits of
transforming itself and its environment by interacting with other
organizations. Such organizations are at once goaded and constrained by the expectations and demands of various constituencies. Internal control and decisionmaking itself involves a complex and dynamic interaction. Every firm is a microcosm to be
described, analyzed and explained. The life process of the organization is not a quest for a single optimal solution, but a series
of choices or compromises among alternative possible strategies,
12See,
73

e.g., R. HALL, ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 39-78 (1972).
See Aldrich & Pfeffer, supra note 71, at 83.
'4See J.D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION (1967); White, Resources as Determinants of Organizational Behavior, AD.Sci. Q. 366 (1974).
7- But cf. Pfeffer & Nowak, Patterns of Joint Venture Activity: Implications for Antitrust
Policy, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 315 (1976).
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many having plausible appeal and several, perhaps, being
backed by their own internal champions. This view, untidy and
frustrating as it is, seems more realistic than the simpler and
more orderly world of the economists.
In family law and criminal law sociologists have addressed
explicitly some of the questions of interest to lawyers. In antitrust only economists have done so. What would develop if
sociologists sought to explain pricing, product and other corporate decisions by reference to the dynamics of the social system
of which corporate activities are a part? Well directed effort
might yield knowledge about the attitudes, myths and ideologies that move those living their lives in corporate settings,
knowledge sufficiently fine-grained so that differences could be
perceived between the characteristics of decisionmaking in organizations of different sizes, for example. Do legal distinctions
correspond with organic variations perceived by sociologists?
How wide is the range of problems faced by corporate decisionmakers for which prevailing systems of belief provide clear answers? What happens when exogenous change confronts the corporate decisionmaker with realities that cannot be assimilated
without stress? Social theory of any kind must simplify, but
sociology may do so at a finer level than does economics. If
conduct abnormal in the market is to be an indicium of predation, for example,76 surely the sociologist is better prepared than
the economist to discern the norm and the aberration. We may
yet attain better theory and empirical material about the welfare
significance of changes in corporate structure than economics
can avail.
The related discipline of political science is also of potential
interest, particularly those aspects of it most closely akin to
economics, which current practitioners sometimes call policy
planning. 7 7 The techniques of the policy planner in the antitrust
area might enable us to isolate all of the social and political goals
of competition, to identify the extent to which each of these is
involved in specific situations where a policy choice must be
made, and to identify by analysis the trade-offs that would be
involved in alternative policy choices. This kind of analysis tends
to be eclectic. Yet, there is a developing tradition with its own
76 See text accompanying notes 59-60.
77For a discussion and criticism of much of the relevant literature, see Mueller,

Public Choice: A Survey, 14 J. EcoN.

LITERATURE

395 (1976).

1236

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 125:1214

canons of excellence. Policy issues should be identified with
specificity. Relevant value systems should be surveyed and policy
criteria chosen, and the basis for these value choices should be
explained. A range of possible alternative policies should then be
selected for analysis, with the rationale for each being identified.
After the preliminary steps are completed, the foreseeable effects of adopting and implementing each of the alternative
policies should be analyzed. The analysis should be rigorous, yet
more pragmatic than theoretical, and the analysis should be solidly based on available empirical data.
Consider, as an example, the question whether vertical resale restraints should be forbidden. An economic approach seeks
to determine whether allocative efficiency would be helped or
hurt by the intervention.18 A policy planning approach would
ask, in addition, who cares? (More precisely it would try to determine who, if reasonably well informed and self regarding,
ought to care, and why?) Such an inquiry would lead to an
evaluation of present industrial practice and likely changes, assuming various possible public interventions that would consider
not merely efficiency effects, but other identifiable social and
economic effects. If resale restraints may be lawfully imposed by
a manufacturer, dealers and consumers live in a somewhat different world than if such restraints are unlawful. When such
restraints are imposed, there will presumably be both costs and
benefits for dealers and consumers. For example, both of these
groups will have fewer decisions to make. This reduction in their
respective ranges of freedom, opportunity, and responsibility
will for each group reduce both occasions for accomplishment and satisfaction and occasions for failure and frustration.
A comprehensive analysis would explore and seek to evaluate
all of these aspects of the system. Nor would it ignore the nonefficiency consequences on decisionmakers within the manufacturer's organization. Increasing the range of choice open to
dealers and consumers reduces the range of choice open to
executives of manufacturers. Finally, a policy planning analysis
would try to analyze the political feasibility and the attendant
costs and benefits associated with the legal intervention under
consideration.
"8Compare Comanor, Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its
Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1968), uith Bork, The Rule of Reason and Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 375 (1966). See text accompanying
note 38 supra.

1977]

SOURCES OF WISDOM FOR ANTITRUST

Conventional economics, useful as it is, gains some of its
power and much of its rigor, then, by excluding relevant concerns that are difficult to quantify or to fit into mechanical models. Other social sciences may eventually prove useful to policy
makers who ought to try to cope with some of the factors that
conventional economics ignores. Yet even as the subject matter
of the social theorists may inform antitrust with considerations
beyond the ken of the economist, the mode of thought of any
social scientist may impose other constraints. Most social science
presupposes a dynamic system of interactions making it possible
to trace the effects of changes in any one element in the system
upon its other elements. All such thinking inevitably generalizes
and simplifies as it systematizes. Are there yet other styles of
inquiry and analysis from which antitrust might derive insights
that have a keener eye for what is unique and particular in given
institutions than the social sciences as a category provide?
That question points to the humanities; one thinks, of
course, of history. It is a truism that history can enrich understanding of antitrust, but a truism much neglected. An historical
outlook alters the perspective and affects what is to be seen.
History itself reveals the variety of forces that fashioned the
antitrust enactments, 79 and the consequent multiplicity of goals
the law may pursue. Yet a historical mode of perception further
leads one to recognize that the social functions of antitrust are
not fixed or settled, even at any single point in time, but are an
item in ongoing policy debate." Indeed, at any given time various groups will find in antitrust quite different values and potentials. Today, a conservative might see antitrust as a means for
assuring free markets wherever possible, as a rallying point,
perhaps, for the deregulation movement. 81 A liberal, depending on his particular persuasion, might see antitrust either as
inhibiting movement toward effective social control of the
economy by bolstering the market system, 2 or as adding stability
to the social and economic system, and thus to the political sys79

See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
8" It bears note that the ideas embodied in economic theory have also changed over
time, and no doubt will continue to do so. Compare, e.g., Clark, supra note 25, with F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1970),

each of
which represents an orthodoxy for its period. See generally J. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC ANALOGIES (1954).
8 See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 239(c) (1977).
82

See, e.g., K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 184-88 (1967) (antitrust attacks the form rather than the substance of concentration by failing to police oligopoly).
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tem, by providing media for the expression of complaints about
economic privilege and power.a83 From a radical perspective antitrust might today be seen as an ameliorative charade. 8 4 An
historical perspective widens the student's view, allowing him to
observe all aspects and evaluate their relevance. These general
contributions of history, while perhaps the most important it has
to make, are not likely to provide guides for the development of
specific antitrust rules. History can, however, help those fashioning rules from falling into one or another kind of provincialism.
Moreover, the ways history can contribute may go beyond
the general insights it offers. An historian explains past events,
and the field of historical study includes economic, business and
industrial events. The traditional narrative historian examining
such events focuses on describing developments and explaining
them. Any explanation of human events is in some sense a
theory about how human beings act, but the traditional
economic historian neither develops nor draws upon general
theory about economic relationships. His purpose is no broader
than to explain the particular sequence of economic events that
he has described.

8 5

Today, there is also a new style of historical inquiry into
economic events, drawing more explicitly on theory, and fitting
better with the social sciences than it does with the humanities. I
refer to the work of the cliometricians. 8 6 By finding ways to mine
data from the past they are opening opportunities for industrial
organization theorists, as for other economists, to refine theory
through explorations of the factual resources of the past. In
some instances, it may be possible to "test" theory, even for history to provide experiments in the form of situations duplicating
theoretical models in which outcomes are already recorded in
ways that can be compared with those the theory would
predict.

87

" See Blake & Jones, supra note 36, at 383-84.
8' Id. 377-78 & n.3.
8 See Habakkuk, Economic History and Economic Theory, 100 DAEDALUS 305 (1971).
86
Id. See also McCloskey, Does the Post Have Useful Economics?, 14 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 434 (1976).
" A growing body of literature identifies historical questions amenable to quantitative investigation and the use of computers, and uses economic theory and economic
models as bases for explaining past events. Prominent examples include R. FOGEL,
RAILROADS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH (1964); R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN, TIME
ON THE CROSS (1974);

P. TEMIN, IRON & STEEL IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA

(1964). While most model building historians seem to have relied on economics for
theoretical equipment, there is, of course, no reason why theory drawn from other

social sciences cannot be drawn upon to illuminate the past.
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Although the conjunction between history and economic
theory explored by cliometricians shows potential for the finer
critical development and use of economic theory, it does little to
expand horizons beyond those of economic theory, to bring into
the dynamic the kinds of affective material traditionally ignored by conventional economic theory. Indeed, cliometric
methods, while perhaps enhancing the potential for rigor in
historical inquiry, do so at a cost; much of the Muse's subtlety
and perceptivity is inevitably left behind, and with these, her
penchant for explaining events in humanly satisfying ways even
when the explanation cannot be validated by a set of calculations.8 8 Students of antitrust, then, may turn to cliometrics with
expectations much like those they now bring to economics; but
they can also turn to current practitioners of a more conventional economic history with a very different kind of hope.
There is, indeed, some very interesting non-cliometric economic and business history currently being done-studies that
focus on particular industries, or on particular regions. Such
studies explore processes of economic development and transformation by seeking to identify and understand the myriad
interactions of economic, social, political, and fortuitous forces
in the subject industry or region. 9
In discussing the use of empirical and theoretical material
from other disciplines, it is well to be mindful that the legal
scholar, lawyer or judge may have special relationships to these
materials that are functions of the needs of law and adjudication.
History serves well as an example. One working in law may go to
the past, much as he would go to the law library or to the empirical world immediately at hand. He brings with him a problem about the contours of a rule or policy arguably applicable
to a particular case. He usually brings also a sense for the pos88 To the extent cliometric literature limits its range of inquiry to material the relevance of which is validated by economic theory and, even more narrowly, to data
amenable to quantification and computer analysis, it may miss much that is relevant and
significant in explaining the past. It may signify something about both the potential and
the limits of cliometric techniques to observe that some of the best work in this area is
being done by scholars who profess to be economists, see, e.g., A. FISHLoW, AMERICAN
RAILROADS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1965), and that the
most severely criticized work comes from the hands of scholars who identify themselves
as historians. See P. DAVID, H. GUTMAN, R. SUTCH & P. TERMIN, RECKONING WITH

SLAVERY; A CRITICAL STUDY IN THE QUANTITATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY

(1976), which also identifies other deficiencies in the cliometric approach
89 W. ISARD, E. SCHOOLER AND T. VIETORISZ, INDUSTRIAL CoMPLEx ANALYSIS AND
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF REFINERY-PETROCHEMICAL-SYNTHETIC-FIBRE
COMPLEXES AND PUERTO Rico (1959).
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sible solutions. He already has views about what the rule or policy
ought to be, and he is, in a manner of speaking, seeking validation in the past. He thus makes a first iteration of the past that
may have more to do with his conception of the case at hand,
and how it might be decided, than with what he already knows
about the historical evidence. He then engages in a dialectic, as
it were, between the historical sources and his tentative conception of law or policy. The goal of the exercise is to place the
historical evidence in an ordered relationship with a satisfactory
restatement of the rule or policy. The process may modify or
even transform the investigator's view of the governing rule,
but it would be a mistake to suppose that the past as he reconstructs it is independent of the predispositions implicit in the
problems on which he is working. 90
Among the humanities, history does not stand alone as a
possible source of antitrust insight. Philosophical orjurisprudential inquiry may also illuminate current issues, particularly those
that have to do with the way alternative values are to be integrated into the law. One might address these questions in a
rationalistic spirit. In choosing among alternative antitrust rules
effects on goals like economic efficiency and such social
amenities as wider ranges of opportunity or choice for individuals would be of interest, but the ultimate goal of analysis might
be to identify not the rule most conducive to the maximization of
these values, but the rule most conducive to such a maximization
of them as is consistent with their just distribution.9 ' I am not
suggesting-that trade-offs between greater efficiency and a less
just distribution would be barred. From John Rawls' position I
take it that it would be, 92 but others may find greater appeal in
alternative ethical positions. 93 I am suggesting no more than an
additional complication for the social calculus. It may not be
enough to ask which rule yields the greatest efficiency or even
which rule maximizes individual opportunity. It may be necessary, in addition, to ask who is benefited, and in what degree,
and to consider the justice of that distribution.
9S It might be argued that the process here envisaged is not vastly different from
that in which historians generally engage. See B. CROCE, History and Chronicle, in
HISTORY: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE 11, (1921). For an engaging and perceptive history
of the philosophy of history, see R. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY (1946).
9'See, e.g., Feinberg, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 1004 (1972) (J. RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE).
92
J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
" See Feinberg, supra note 91.
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None of this is intended to assert that there are storehouses
bursting with grains of wisdom to which hungry antitrust
theorists need only turn. Indeed, what seems most instructive
about explorations of the policy planning and jurisprudential
literature is that materials from these disciplines display the
complexity that underlies policy questions such as those encountered in antitrust. If those disciplines fail to supply answers, they
may at least call forth a healthy skepticism about more limited
analyses such as those drawn from conventional economics.
III.

THE USES OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN ANTITRUST

Finally, scholarship can bring anew to antitrust the traditional modes and methods of legal analysis. Antitrust is, after all,
a system of law. That was the congressional choice, and who is to
say it was not a suitable one? Being law, largely judge-made law,
antitrust partakes of the values eminent in the American common law tradition. Major problems to be faced in antitrust during the next decade or so must be solved primarily by drawing
upon this tradition. The interplay of the federal mandate to
compete and state law regulatory regimes comes immediately to
mind. With its decision in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,'4 the Supreme Court, after a lengthy excursion, has returned to a root
path. There remains the task of seeking accommodations between congressional expressions of a national consensus and
cross currents of state legislative or regulatory policy. In that
process values drawn from judicial experience with federalism
will weigh heavily and, no doubt, will modify perceptions about
the urgency of the various alternative substantive policies that
may be involved in particular situations. Sorting out what is most
salient from all that is relevant, identifying possible ways of resolving apparent conflicts by accommodating contending interests rather than sacrificing one to another, sensing the potency of a state or federal policy and the force and directions of
its potential for growth, are all tasks uniquely suitable to the
institutions of the law.
There are other needs that can only be met through the
" 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976). Cantor held that respondent utility's light bulb distribution
plan, implemented pursuant to tariffs approved by the state regulatory agency, was not
exempt from the ban of the Sherman Act because of such approval. The Court distinguished Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), as immunizing from antitrust scrutiny
only "official action taken by state officials," not "private action taken under color of
state law." 96 S. Ct. at 3117.
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conventional techniques of legal analysis and synthesis. One is to
develop procedures allowing all with an interest to be represented. Antitrust deals with questions of broad social and
economic policy. It is anomalous that these issues should be dealt
with as a system of legal rights, obligations and remedies, enforced primarily through adjudication. Often, particularly in
structural litigation, persons who may be significantly affected
are not before the court. Resulting procedural and remedial issues deserve scholarly attention that can probably come most
usefully from lawyers.
Antitrust makes yet another, more general, perhaps more
basic demand on scholarship because antitrust is a system of law,
a demand to which legal scholars are particularly equipped to
respond. Harvard scholarship, as I suggested in the first section,
has been sensitive to the need for antitrust rules of general application. But the overall problem is larger than this. Antitrust
ought to be a system of interrelated legal rules reflecting values
and derived from principles which are legitimate within the context of the American tradition of judge-made law. In dealing
with precedent the processes in which first semester law students
are rigorously drilled ought to be at the forefront. Processes of
analysis and synthesis, the conventional business of deciding
what prior cases hold or imply ought to be carried out in demonstrably reasonable ways and expressed with clarity. 95 Wechslerian
"neutral principles" ought to be discernibly at work. 9 6 The
sources of values and principles that inform decision ought to be
expressed as clearly as possible and their legitimacy ought to be
defended by reference to legislative or constitutional norms or to
moral or institutional norms assimilated over time as a part of
the conventional process of judicial lawmaking. 97 No more in
antitrust than elsewhere should courts act as though each case
were sui generis, a single pebble on a sandy beach. The conventions that legitimize adjudication must apply and a manageable
system of rules of general applicability must be developed.
Scholarship can contribute to this development in antitrust
in ways no other institution can match. In the past, it has done so
primarily by seeking to integrate law and micro-economic
91 See, e.g., Levi, The Nature ofJudicialReasoning, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 395 (1965).
96 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1959).
97
Compare H. HART, THE CONCEvr OF LAw (1961) with Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88
HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1975).
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theory. I am suggesting that it ought now to take up related
tasks. There is a "higher criticism" of judge-made law that examines judicial craftsmanship, value sources, and the complexities, aptness, and legitimacy of institutional arrangements
through which legislative, judicial, state, and federal power are
accommodated to each other. 98 By and large this criticism has
been reserved for constitutional adjudication, federal jurisdiction
and conflicts of law. Intellectual and institutional issues fully as
challenging are involved in antitrust and directly related fields.
Indeed, there are basic tasks to be done. Existing case law must
be brought into conceptual order. There is a need to identify
and express the analogies and distinctions that render results
credible by putting them into ordered relation to other results,
thus giving them doctrinal forms and larger meanings. There
is a need to relate such doctrinal statements to the historical development of the law in a fashion that gives emphasis to elements of constancy, transformation, and novelty. There is a
need to specify the way these doctrinal concepts relate to generalizations of a wider scope or higher order, having an ethical
or a policy content drawn from economics or elsewhere with a
legitimate place in the development of the law. The scholarly
agenda is a large one, and transcends, I think, the adaptation
of conventional economic analysis, however important that task
may continue to be.
9 See Hyman, ConstitutionalJurisprudence and the Teaching of Constitutional Law, 28
STAN. L. REv.

1271 (1976).

